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Self-processing has been related to the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ) as well as to their connectivity. So far, out-of-body experiences (OBEs),
impressive transient deviations of intact bodily self-integration, could be associated with
the TPJ, but the mediation by the frontal lobe, and thus fronto-parietal connectivity, is yet
unknown. Thus, we assessed switching performance to assess fronto-parietal connectivity
when healthy participants [11 reported previous OBEs (OBE-individuals); 36 reported no
previous OBEs (nOBE-individuals)] performed two different mental own body imagery
tasks. By using the same stimuli of a front-facing and back-facing human figure, a cue
simultaneously presented with the target indicated to participants whether they had to
take the position of the depicted human figure (disembodied self-location mimicking an
OBE) or had to imagine that the figure was their own reflection in a mirror (embodied Self-
location). By repeating trials of the same task instruction for a differing number of trials
(2–6 trials), we could assess switch costs when alternating between these two task
instructions with switch costs being considered to be a behavioural indicator of fronto-
parietal connectivity. Results showed that OBE-individuals performed worse than nOBE-
individuals in switch trials, but not in trials in which the same task instruction was
repeated. Moreover, this reduced performance was specific to body positions that are
normally considered easier (front-facing in the mirror condition; back-facing in the OBE
mimicking condition). These findings suggest that a fronto-parietal network might be
implicated in OBEs, and that the flexible and spontaneous egocentric perspective taking of
self-congruent body representations is hampered in individuals with previous OBEs.
ª 2008 Elsevier Srl. All rights reserved.1. Introduction of agency; being author of one’s own thoughts and actions)Intact self representation relies on the ability to experience
oneself as an enduring and spatial entity (i.e., the feeling that
we are the same person across time and space) to which
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related information (Gallagher et al., 2000; Metzinger, 2003;
Legrand, 2007).
Neuroscientific studies showed that the prefrontal cortex
(PFC) and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) are importantly
implicated in self-processing. For instance, functional
magnetic resonance imaging studies revealed PFC and TPJ
activation when healthy participants performed social and
cognitive perspective taking tasks (e.g., theory of mind, ToM)
(e.g., Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe and
Wexler, 2005; Vollm et al., 2006). Studies that investigated the
neural correlates of the feeling of agency also point to the
implication of the PFC (Vinogradov et al., 2006) or the TPJ
(Farrer et al., 2004). Support for the role of the PFC and/or the
TPJ in such self-processing tasks is also supported by findings
from patients with focal brain lesions (Apperly et al., 2004).
With respect to the interplay between the PFC and the TPJ,
it has been suggested that the PFC might hold different
perspectives in working memory (e.g., Gallagher and Frith,
2003), inhibit the interference from one’s own (as compared to
another) perspective (Ruby and Decety, 2003), and might be
important in executive response selection (Behrendt, 2004).
The TPJ might be relevant tomental state reasoning in general
(Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003), or to lower level sensory pro-
cessing of relevant stimuli (Allison et al., 2000; Frith and Frith,
1999). Recent studies by Apperly et al. (2004) and Saxe and
Wexler (2005) would, however, suggest that the TPJ is crucially
involved in ToM reasoning. Together, it could be assumed that
intact self-processing might rely on an intact dynamic infor-
mation flow in fronto-parietal networks.
Self-processing is impaired in patients with schizophrenia,
in particular when individuals suffer from passivity symp-
toms (e.g., thought intrusion, loss of agency, alien delusions).
Thus, deficient self-processing in these patients has been
found in ToM tasks (Frith and Corcoran, 1996; Schenkel et al.,
2005), empathy tasks (Langdon et al., 2006), and agency tasks
(e.g., Farrer et al., 2004; Lindner et al., 2005; Spence et al., 1997).
With respect to implicated brain regions, self-processing
deficits in these patients have been associated with the PFC
and the TPJ (Brunet-Gouet and Decety, 2006 for review; see
also Farrer et al., 2004; Spence et al., 1997). Recent studies
using diffusion tensor imaging support the notions (Friston,
1998) that patients with schizophrenia show abnormalities in
cortico-cortical as well as cortico-subcortical connectivity (as
measured by white matter integrity), whether in the early
illness onset (Federspiel et al., 2006; Hao et al., 2006) or in the
more chronic state (Honey et al., 2005; Nestor et al., 2004).
Also, patients with schizotypal personality disorder as
compared to controls reveal altered fronto-temporal connec-
tivity (Nakamura et al., 2005). In sum, findings from healthy
participants, neurological populations and patients along the
schizophrenia spectrum would suggest that self-processing
relates to both the PFC and the TPJ, and that impaired self
representations might relate to a disconnection between
these brain sites.
Given the importance of the PFC and the TPJ (and thus their
connectivity) in self-processing such as agency, ToM, and
perspective taking, one might hypothesize that PFC and its
connectivity to the TPJ is also implicated in out-of-body
experiences (OBEs). OBEs are impressive disturbances of selfrepresentation characterized by disembodiment, altered
visuo-spatial perspective and agency and have primarily been
linked to the TPJ (see below) although they might also follow
damage to frontal cortex (Devinsky et al., 1989). OBEs are
transient and highly vivid, presumably of paroxysmal nature
(Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke et al., 2005; Blanke et al., 2002).
More specifically, during an OBE, the individual has the tran-
sient impression that the self is detached from the physical
body, and that the world and the own physical body is seen
from an elevated spatial position (Blanke and Mohr, 2005 for
recent review). Findings from neurological populations would
link OBEs with TPJ damage (Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke et al.,
2005; Blanke et al., 2002; Brandt et al., 2005).
Because OBEs are rare and occur spontaneously (Black-
more, 1982), testing a priori the potential role of the PFC in
OBEs seems almost impossible. Recent reports, however, not
only suggested that brain processes during the mental trans-
formation of one’s own bodymight engage some similar brain
mechanisms as those activated during spontaneous OBEs
(Blackmore, 1982; Brugger, 2002; Cook and Irwin, 1983), but
also provided empirical evidence for this claim (Blanke et al.,
2005). In more detail, Blanke et al. (2005), performed an event-
related potential (ERP) study and a transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) study with healthy participants as well as
depth-electrode recordings and continuous surface EEG
recordings from a patient with epilepsy. The ERP study
showed the selective activation of the TPJ at 330–400 msec
after stimulus onset (see also Arzy et al., 2007) when healthy
volunteers imagined themselves in the position and visual
perspective that is generally reported by people experiencing
spontaneous OBEs (OBT-task, see Section 2 for further details).
The TMS study showed that interference with the TPJ by TMS
during this same time period impaired performance in the
OBT-task in healthy volunteers relative to TMS over a control
site at the intraparietal sulcus. No such inference was
observed for imagined spatial transformations of external
objects suggesting the selective implication of the TPJ in
mental imagery of one’ own body.With respect to the last part
of this report, the epileptic patient, when experiencing OBEs,
revealed seizure activity at surface electrode positions around
the TPJ. When performing the OBT-task, ERPs from subdural
electrodes showed task-specific activation at the TPJ.
Together, these results by Blanke et al. (2005) suggest that the
TPJ is a crucial structure for the conscious experience of the
normal self mediating spatial unity of self and body.
In order to test the fronto-parietal mediation of OBEs
neuropsychologically, we heremade use of amodified version
of the OBT-task (Arzy et al., 2007; Arzy et al., 2006; Blanke et al.,
2005; Mohr et al., 2006): we asked individuals with previous
OBEs (OBE-individuals) and those without previous OBEs
(nOBE-individuals) to switch continuously between the OBT-
task (Arzy et al., 2007; Blanke et al., 2005;Mohr et al., 2006), and
between another egocentric mental perspective taking
condition (Arzy et al., 2006), in which the same stimuli were
shown, but in which participants were required to imagine
that the depicted humanfigurewas the reflection of their body
in a mirror (Mirror-task). Both tasks can be suggested to target
the ‘‘body schema’’ (Coslett, 1998; Parsons, 1994), but to differ
in the egocentric frame of reference (Zacks and Michelon,
2005) with the OBT-task relying probably more strongly on an
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on an ‘‘intrinsic egocentric coordinate system’’ (e.g., Buxbaum
et al., 2000; Shenton et al., 2004). Support for a dissociation
between tasks has been provided by Arzy et al. (2006) who
found that brain activity during the Mirror-task dissociated
from brain activity during the OBT-task temporally (earlier
task-related brain activation during the Mirror-task) and
anatomically (both tasks activated lateral temporo-occipital
cortex and TJP, but the TPJ was more strongly recruited in the
OBT-task and the lateral temporo-occipital cortex more
strongly in the Mirror-task). Thus, by using these two task
instructions while keeping the visual input constant, we
would predict that OBE-individuals, due to their potentially
compromised brain network related to the OBT-task (Blanke
et al., 2005), would show inferior performance (slower
responding, lower accuracy) when switching between these
two tasks as compared to the nOBE-individuals.
The switching component can be considered sensitive to
fronto-parietal connectivity, because task switching has been
shown to rely on the executive control of the PFC, whether
conclusions are drawn from behavioral studies on brain-
damaged patients (Kumada and Humphreys, 2006; Milner,
1963; Stuss and Benson, 1986), non-human primates
(Mansouri et al., 2006; Miller and Cohen, 2001), or from brain-
imaging studies (Brass and von Cramon, 2002; Passingham
et al., 2000). It has also been shown that the PFC appears to act
in concert with the parietal cortex (Chafee and Goldman-
Rakic, 1998; Dove et al., 2000; Ruge et al., 2005). Information
flow might be directed from frontal cortex to parietal cortex
with the former involved in action execution and the latter in
the processing of stimulus properties (Ruge et al., 2005). While
both processes might be relevant to switching trials (SwT) and
trials in which the same task is performed as in the preceding
trial (repeat trials, RepT), this fronto-parietal network might
be under higher challenge in the former than the latter case
(Ruge et al., 2005). Thus, in case that OBEs might also be
mediated by the PFC, we here predicted that switching
between the two tasks would result in higher switch costs in
OBE-individuals as compared to nOBE-individuals.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Forty-eight participants (24 men) with a mean (SD) age of
27.3 yrs. (10.3 yrs., range 18–53 yrs.) were involved in the
study. Themajoritywere undergraduate students. Of these, 12
(5 men) reported that they had at least one OBE in their life-
time (further details of participants’ OBEs can be found below
and in Tables 1 and 2).
2.2. Participant selection
The study was announced by public advertisement posted at
local places in and around the University of Bristol as well as
after lectures. In the advertisement, we indicated that we
were searching for volunteerswith previous OBEs. In addition,
we controlled for the potential confound that differences
between OBE-individuals and nOBE-individuals might bemediated by participants’ schizotypal experiences. McCreary
and Claridge (1995, 1996, 2002) reported that OBE-individuals
as compared to nOBE-individuals reveal more positive schiz-
otypal features (experiences reminiscent of positive symp-
toms in schizophrenia). Also, positive schizotypy has been
reported to impair performance in the present OBT-task (Arzy
et al., 2007; Mohr et al., 2006). Thus, we additionally indicated
that we are interested in volunteers who strongly believe or
disbelieve in extrasensory perception such as spiritual
communication, sixth sense and paranormal phenomena.
Prior to study inclusion, interested candidates received
further standardized written study information, and were
asked to fill in self-report questionnaires (see below). OBE-
individuals were further interviewed to verify that they had
classical OBEs where the individual felt himself or herself to
be in an elevated spatial position, and to see the own body and
the world from this elevated perspective (see also Mohr and
Blanke, 2005). As indicated by self-report of included candi-
dates, the OBEs were not experienced under the influence of
drugs, alcohol, or as the result of accident or trauma.
Furthermore, we excluded individuals, who had a previous
psychiatric, neurological, or drug history, as well as learning
disabilities. Casual consumption of cannabis was not consid-
ered an abuse, provided that the time since last consumption
was more than two months (and unrelated to OBEs, Overney
et al., 2009, this issue). Moreover, for nOBE-individuals, we
only tested right-handed participants (see Kita et al., 2007 for
cut-off scores) according to a standardized handedness
questionnaire (Oldfield, 1971). Based on the rarity of OBEs in
the general population (Blackmore, 1982), every OBE-indi-
vidual was invited to participate [two participants (one man)
were non-right-handed].
Motivated by peer review, we contacted all OBE-individ-
uals again to obtain more detailed descriptions about their
OBEs. All of them responded by email to a standardized
questionnaire. One participant had been excluded for anal-
ysis (see under Section 2.6), and was not contacted again. The
questionnaire asked (see Tables 1 and 2 for individual
answers) 1) for a brief description of what happened when
they have an OBE (see Table 1), 2) approximately how many
OBEs they had in their lifetime (Num, Table 2), 3) how old
they were when they started (First OBE, Table 2), 4) approxi-
mately how often OBEs occur now (Freq, Table 2), 5) how long
the OBEs lasted (Dur, Table 2), 6) in which physical position
they were when OBEs happened, i.e., whether they were led
down, sat down, walking around, or a combination (Body Pos,
Table 2), 7) whether they have been alert, relaxed or sleepy
when OBEs happened, and whether, if they were sleepy, they
occurred when falling asleep or when waking up (Alert,
Table 2), 8) whether they felt comfortable and happy about
their OBEs or whether they left them feeling anxious (Mood,
Table 2), 9) how far away they were from their physical body
during an OBE, and whether they were above/to the left/to
the right of the physical body, or whether this varies (View
Pos, Table 2), 10) which body parts of their physical body they
were looking at, i.e., face, limbs, torso etc. (See Body, Table 2),
11) how they recognized their physical body as being them-
selves when they are disembodied, and whether they look as
they normally would when they look in the mirror, or
whether they looked in some way different (Recog, Table 2),
Table 1 – Brief descriptions of individuals’ OBEs (P[ participant). In brackets, the sensual experiences during OBEs are
provided.
Ps Description (sensual experiences)
P1 Sensation of being ‘‘elsewhere’’, but physically in same place (feeling weightless)
P2 Not in control of movements outside my body. Feeling cold & loud silence in ears (phantom feeling of physical self, unable to
move/interact)
P3 Not being attached to body. Complete stillness of mind. Sometimes seeing images with the feeling they are related to particular person
(when entering state of OBE, all sensual feelings fade away)
P4 View myself always from above, e.g., while walking down street (feeling of disembodiment)
P5 Between sleep & wake see self as if someone else, detached from body & looking at self (weightless, temperature irrelevant, unable to
physically interact, but everything very very abnormally vivid and bright)
P6 Wake up, realize that I am looking down on myself in bed (weightless, unable to interact)
P7 Playing pool (sober), standing away from myself watching me playing (disembodied self can move and think, but only passively observe
environment)
P8 Feels like I see self from another view (outside of my body). See myself as any general person rather than an individuals (as in me) (no
particular sensual experiences)
P9 Floated out of my body through back. Looking down on myself lying down in bed (floating in air, not having obvious limbs, OBEs too
short to interact with myself or environment)
P10 Detached from physical body, lack of energy to control mental spirits (feel hot and dizzy)
P11 While sleeping, wake up lying in bed, and then realize that I am ‘‘out-of-body’’. See things normally, albeit pitch dark (weightless,
temperature irrelevant, sense of touch and pain, moving around as ‘‘sleep-walking’’, experience of illusions)
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to move/physically interact with the environment when they
have a sense of disembodiment (sensual experiences, Table 1),
and finally 13) whether they ever had the feeling of thereTable 2 – Descriptions and phenomenology of individuals’ OBE
be found in Section 2 under Section 2.2).
P1 P2 P3
Sex Male Female Male
Age 20 yrs. 20 yrs. 19 yrs.
Num 6–7 2 4-5
First OBE 11 yrs. 12 yrs. 16 yrs.
Freq 1 period per yr. 2 only Last 24 month
Dur Many for several days 5 min 30 min
Body Pos Sitting Lying Lying/sitting
Alert Sleepy Sleepy/relaxed Sleepy (but ale
Mood Comfort Bit anxious Comfort
View Pos Above 2–4 feet right Above
See Body Face Face, arm Not sure
Recog LN IJK Not sure
Pres Rarely Rarely Yes
P7 P8 P
Sex Female Female Ma
Age 23 yrs. 19 yrs. 21 yrs.
Num 1 3 3
First OBE 22 yrs. 15 yrs. 14 yrs.
Freq Once only Once in 2 yrs. Not for wh
Dur Few min 2 min Few min
Body Pos Walking Sitting/standing Lying
Alert Alert/relaxed Relaxed Between w
Mood Anxious Strange/unnerved Relaxed/co
View body 1 m right Opposite, 1 m right 1 m back,
See body Face, torso Face, shoulders Head, tors
Recog SF – LN
Pres No No No
P¼ Participant, Comfort¼ comfortable, WB¼whole body, LN¼ look norm
a But I wear more often a white polo shirt than not.being a presence in the room with them knowing that they
are quite alone (Presence, Table 2).
The descriptions show several consistencies across indi-
viduals. All OBEs here were of visual nature (please note thats (descriptions of the different labels in the first column can
P4 P5 P6
Male Female Female
41 yrs. 21 yrs. 21 yrs.
110 4 4
16 yrs. 4 yrs. 19 yrs.
s ago 2 per yr. Rarely 2 per yr.
2 min Few min 5 min
Walking Lying Lying
rt mind) Alert Sleepy>waking Sleepy
No change 2 peaceful/2 shaken Comfort
Above, 2 m Above, close 2 m above
Top of head WB, face WB, face, limbs
LNa LN LN
No No Often
9 P10 P11
le Female Male
19 yrs. 19 yrs.
4–5 20
8 yrs. Always
ile Last 24 months ago Every few months
Few min 20–45 min
Lying Lying
ake-sleep Falling asleep Falling asleep, waking up
ntent Nothing Interesting
above Above Above, right
o Can’t remember Once upper body
IJK LN
No Rarely
al, IJK¼ I just know, SF¼ Sense of familiarity.
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2005)), some are linked to sleep and sleep paralysis (Cheyne
and Girard, 2009, this issue; Girard and Cheyne, 2004), occur
mainly in a relaxed state (lying or sitting) (Blanke and Mohr,
2005; Cheyne, 2002), are perceived more frequently in the
upper right than left visual field (Brugger et al., 1996; see also
Girard and Cheyne, 2004; Girard et al., 2007) with about 1–2 m
distance between the physical body and the experienced
location of the self (e.g., Blanke and Mohr, 2005; Bradford,
2005; Girard et al., 2007), are of short duration (Blanke and
Mohr, 2005), and are sometimes accompanied by a feeling of
weightlessness/vestibular sensations (Blanke and Mohr, 2005;
Cheyne and Girard, 2009, this issue).2.3. Schizotypy questionnaires
In order to select a control population (nOBE-individuals) with
a large range of schizotypy scores, we randomly intermixed 65
items from two true–false self-report positive schizotypy
questionnaires.
Magical ideation (MI) scale: This is a validated 30-item
positive schizotypy questionnaire (Eckblad and Chapman,
1983) that includes items such as ‘‘I sometimes have a feeling
of gaining or losing energy when people look at me or touch
me,’’ (keyed true) or ‘‘Some people can make me aware of
them just by thinking aboutme’’ (keyed true). Scores on theMI
scale range from 0 to 30, with higher scores indicating more
pronounced magical thinking. The scale is published in full in
Eckblad and Chapman (1983), and normative data can be
found in Garety and Wessely (1994).
Perceptual Aberration (PA) scale: This is a 35-item positive
schizotypy questionnaire (Chapman et al., 1978) that includes
items such as ‘‘Occasionally I have felt as thoughmy body did
not exist’’ (keyed true) and ‘‘I have never felt that my arms or
legs have momentarily grown in size’’ (keyed false). Addi-
tional literature concerning reliable and valid use of the PA
scale in the study of schizotypy can be found elsewhere
(Chapman et al., 1994; Lenzenweger et al., 1994; Tallent and
Gooding, 1999). Higher scores indicate more PA.2.4. Mental imagery task
Body stimuli: Drawings aremodified versions used in previous
mental own body transformation tasks (Arzy et al., 2007; Arzy
et al., 2006; Blanke et al., 2005; Mohr et al., 2006; Ratcliff, 1979;
Zacks et al., 1999). The schematic figures were either facing
toward or away from the volunteer (Fig. 1). Front- and back-
facing figures had the same outline and differed in the
rendering of the clothing of the figure and the presence of
a face (front-facing; Fig. 1) or the back of a head (back-facing;
Fig. 1). The hands of the figures were marked such that one
hand appeared as wearing a grey glove with a black ring at the
wrist. This indication of side could appear on the right or on
the left hand. To assess task switching, the body figures were
either surrounded by an oval shape or by a rectangle resulting
in eight variations of the stimuli (Fig. 1). These two different
frames were used to indicate two different task conditions, as
will be outlined in the subsequent paragraph.2.5. Procedure
Participants were set centrally to the computer screenwith an
eye–screen distance of 57 cm. The keyboard was positioned so
that the response keys were comfortably accessible to the
responding hand and central to the body midline.
Stimuli were presented in the centre of the computer
screen. The figures appeared 9.5 cm 6 cm on the screen and
the whole image appeared 11.5 cm 8 cm on the screen. Each
presentation of one of the eight stimuli was preceded by
a central fixation cross presented for 800 msec.Where the oval
shape surrounded the figure, participants had to make left–
right judgments about the indicated human hand of the figure
imagining that the human figure was a reflection of their body
in a mirror (Mirror-task). If the rectangular shape surrounded
the figure, participants had to make left–right judgments
about the indicated human hand of the figure after having
mentally imagined being in the position of this figure (OBT-
task). In both instances, participants had to decide whether
the figure’s gloved hand would be their own right or left hand.
Key 1 on the numeric keypad was used to indicate a ‘‘left
hand’’ response and key 2 for a ‘‘right hand’’ response. All
participants responded using the middle and index fingers of
their dominant hand, this being the right hand in all but 2 OBE
cases. The stimulus remained on the screen until a response
was given making the trials self-paced. In line with previous
switching tasks, to counteract poormotivation and encourage
correct responses (Kleinsorge, 2004; Li, 2004; Miyake et al.,
2000), feedback was provided after each trial by presenting
centrally on the screen the word ‘‘Great’’ in red typeface for
a correct response and ‘‘Too bad’’ in blue for an incorrect
response for 800 ms. It was emphasized to participants that
while it was important to respond as swiftly as possible,
participants should primarily focus on accuracy and always
perform the mental body imagery task before responding.
In order to obtain ameasure of switching performance, the
sequence was pseudorandomized, i.e., trials of the same
instructionwere repeated (RepT) between 2 and 6 times before
the alternative instruction was presented (SwT). There were
a total of 400 trials presented in 2 blocks of 200 trials. Within
these 400 trials there were a total of 100 SwT, 50 in each of the
two blocks. The number of SwT used here is in excess of those
used in comparable switching tasks (e.g., 90 switches in Hester
and Garavan, 2005; 48 and 60 switches in Miyake et al., 2000).
The RepT and SwT were pseudorandom between blocks, i.e.,
the order in block 1 was reversed for block 2. Order of block
presentation was counterbalanced between participants.
The experimental blocks were preceded by a practice block
of 20 trials at the end of which a message was displayed
informing participants of the accuracy percentage attained. If
the accuracy score was below 60%, participants were required
to repeat the practice block before the experimental trial
began. Between experimental blocks, participants were able
to rest for as long as they needed. The experimental blocks
took approximately 10 min each.
2.6. Data analysis
One OBE participant (female) was excluded from further
analysis. This participant had exceedingly highmean reaction
Fig. 1 – Stimuli used in the switching task. In the upper row, the oval shape indicated that participants had to imagine that
the figure was their own reflection in a mirror (Mirror-task), while in the lower row, the rectangular shape indicated that
participants had to imagine taking the position of the depicted figure (OBT-task). Right–left decisions had to be made with
respect to the own body. Correct responses are indicated under each picture.
Table 3 – Unpaired t-tests (df[ 45) for age and schizotypy
scores between OBE-individuals and nOBE-individuals.
nOBE OBE t p
Age (in yrs.) 28.3 10.4 22.1 6.4 1.88 .07
MI 10.4 8.7 11.8 6.0 .52 .61
PA 7.6 8.1 11.7 7.8 1.49 .14
MI: magical ideation scores, PA: perceptual aberration scores.
c o r t e x 4 5 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 2 1 6 – 2 2 7 221times (RTs) for RepT (3514.2) and SwT (4807.4) as compared to
those of the remaining sample (RepT: 1242.5 285.6; SwT:
1477.43 354.82). The following analyses are thus based on
a sample of 47 participants. Five of these participants per-
formed the practice block twice (three nOBE-individuals). Two
participants (P4, P7, Table 2) reported OBEs during walking,
and might thus be considered atypical (see Tables 1 and 2).
Inspecting their mean RTs and mean percent correct
responses, they did not differ from the remaining OBE-indi-
viduals, but rather led right in the middle of the range of
scores of the remaining OBE-individuals.
From this sample, we calculated mean RTs for correct
responses and mean percent correct responses for RepT and
SwT in the back- and front-facing body positions for the
Mirror-task and OBT-task separately. According to previous
studies (Kiesel et al., 2007; Miyake et al., 2000), individual data
points that were more than 3SD above the participants’ mean
were removed for RepT and SwT separately.
In order to compare RepT and SwT performance between
groups, and to account for the possibility that the dependent
variables (mean RT, percent accuracy) were differently
affected for the different task conditions, we performed
repeated measures ANCOVAs with task condition (RepT,
SwT), task instruction (Mirror-task, OBT-task), and body
position (front-facing, back-facing) as repeatedmeasures, and
group (OBE, nOBE) as between-subject-measures. In order to
control that significant findingswith respect to groupwere not
mediated by participants’ positive schizotypy, (Arzy et al.,
2007; McCreery and Claridge, 2002; Mohr et al., 2006), we
included the summed MI and PA scores (PerMag scores) asa covariate. Thus, significant main effects and interactions
regarding the between-subject factor group are not the result
of varying or mediating degrees of positive schizotypy. Post-
hoc comparisons correcting for multiple comparisons were
performed with Newman–Keuls tests. All p-values are two-
tailed, and the significance level was set to alpha¼ .05.3. Results
3.1. Participants
Separate unrelated t-tests showed that OBE-individuals did
not differ from nOBE-individuals in MI scores and PA scores,
but that OBE-individuals tended to be younger than nOBE-
individuals (Table 3). In line with previous reports (e.g.,
Chapman and Chapman, 1987; Chapman et al., 1994), MI and
PA scores were highly correlated (r¼ .72, p< .0001), and were
summed to obtain PerMag scores.
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The repeated measures ANCOVA on mean RT with task
condition (RepT, SwT), body position (back-facing, front-
facing), and task instruction (mirror-task, OBT-task) as
repeated measures, group (OBE, nOBE) as between-subject-
measure, and PerMag scores as covariate showed that
response latencies were faster for RepT (1242.5 285.6ms)
than SwT [1477.4 354.8, F(1,44)¼ 44.80, p< .0001], for back-
facing (1332.5 311.8ms) than front-facing (1386.0 322.1ms)
figures [F(1,44)¼ 10.27, p¼ .003], and in the OBT-task
(1289.8 284.3) than Mirror-task [1428.7 365.9, F(1,44)¼
11.17, p¼ .002]. The significant interaction between task
instruction and body position [F(1,44)¼ 29.87, p< .0001]
resulted from faster response latencies in the front-facing
(1375.4 346.8ms) than back-facing (1482.0 387.0) body
position in the Mirror-task ( p¼ .002) and in the back-facing
(1183.0 277.8ms) than front-facing (1396.6 325.3ms) body
position in the OBT-task ( p¼ .0001). Moreover, reaction times
for back-facing body positionswere faster in the OBT-task than
Mirror-task ( p¼ .0002) and equally fast for front-facing body
positions in both task instructions ( p¼ .46). The remaining
comparisons were not significant (all F-values< 3.82).
The same ANCOVA on percent accuracy showed that more
correct responses were made for RepT (93.7 4.5) than SwT
[88.9 9.8%, F(1,44)¼ 14.54, p¼ .0004], and in the OBT-task
(92.3 7.0) than Mirror-task [90.2 7.7ms, F(1,44)¼ 4.53,
p¼ .04]. The significant interaction between task condition
and group [F(1,44)¼ 7.84, p¼ .008] resulted from OBE-individ-
uals performing worse in SwT (83.2 14.4) than RepT
(92.5 5.9ms, p¼ .0001), while the same comparison for
nOBE-individuals just failed significance level (SwT: 90.6 7.3;
RepT: 94.0 4.0ms, p¼ .055). Moreover, groups did not differ
for RepT ( p¼ .66), but for SwT, OBE-individuals performed
worse than nOBE-individuals ( p¼ .03). The last significant
finding (all other F-values< 3.55) was the four-way interaction
[F(1,44)¼ 4.93, p¼ .03] indicating that the group difference in
SwT and RepT might also depend on body position and task
instruction. Post-hoc comparisons (see below) indicate that it
is particularly impairing for OBE participants to perform SwT
when presented with the commonly less cognitively
demanding body positions (front-facing body position in the
Mirror-task, back-facing body position in the OBT-task,
Fig. 2B). To demonstrate this observation in more detail, none
of the post-hoc comparisons were significant 1) between the
different percent accuracy measures when only nOBE-indi-
viduals were considered (all p-values> .33), and 2) for the
different percent accuracy measures when compared
between nOBE and OBE participants (all p-values> .44). When
percent accuracy measures were compared for OBE partici-
pants only, threemajor clusters of findingswere significant: 1)
for back-facing body positions in the OBT-task, OBE-individ-
uals performed worse in SwT than RepT ( p¼ .0002) and for
front-facing body positions in the Mirror-task, OBE-individ-
uals also performed worse in SwT than RepT ( p¼ .0002;
Fig. 2A and 2B); 2) for SwT in the Mirror-task, participants
performed worse for front-facing than back-facing body
positions ( p¼ .004), and for SwT in the OBT-task, participants
performed worse for back-facing than front-facing bodypositions ( p¼ .02, Fig. 2B); and 3) for SwT of back-facing body
positions, participants performed worse in the OBT-task than
Mirror-task ( p¼ .03), and for SwT of front-facing body posi-
tions, participants performed worse in the Mirror-task than
OBT-task ( p¼ .001; all remaining p-values> .15).4. Discussion
Self representation has been shown to depend on the PFC, TPJ,
and their connectivity (e.g., Apperly et al., 2004; Farrer et al.,
2004; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe and
Wexler, 2005; Vollm et al., 2006). Accordingly, we suggested
that OBEs might not only be mediated by the TPJ as suggested
recently (Blanke and Mohr, 2005; Blanke et al., 2005), but also
depend on frontal lobe functioning and processing (Devinsky
et al., 1989). To test this hypothesis with neuropsychological
behavioral means, we assessed switching performance
between two mental own body imagery tasks (Arzy et al.,
2006) with the OBT-task being sensitive to both OBEs and TPJ
function (Blanke et al., 2005). Switching performance between
the OBT-task and the Mirror-task was considered to depend
on an intact fronto-parietal network (Chafee and Goldman-
Rakic, 1998; Dove et al., 2000; Ruge et al., 2005) including here
the PFC and TPJ. If this network is more compromised in OBE-
individuals as compared to nOBE-individuals, we predicted
that OBE-individuals should yield higher switch costs than
nOBE-individuals.
Switching continuously between two tasks, OBE-individ-
uals and nOBE-individuals performed egocentric perspective
transformations by making left-right judgments of hands of
depicted human figures (Zacks and Michelon, 2005). One
instruction (OBT-task) asked participants to imagine that they
are in the position of depicted human figures (Arzy et al., 2006;
Blanke et al., 2005; Mohr et al., 2006), while the other task
instruction (Mirror-task) asked participants to imagine that
depicted human figures were a reflection of their bodies in
a mirror (Arzy et al., 2006). Accordingly, we showed the same
figures but only alternated the cognitive demand with respect
to the egocentric bodily perspective that was taken mentally
by the participants. The overall findings replicated previous
observations that participants were faster and more accurate
for front-facing body positions as compared to back-facing
body positions in the Mirror-task (Arzy et al., 2006) and for
back-facing body positions as compared to front-facing body
positions in the OBT-task (Arzy et al., 2007; Arzy et al., 2006;
Blanke et al., 2005; Mohr et al., 2006; Zacks et al., 1999). These
overall behavioural findings are in agreement with previous
reports regarding mental rotation of objects (Shepard and
Metzler, 1971; Wohlschla¨ger and Wohlschla¨ger, 1998), and
body parts (Bonda et al., 1995; Cooper and Shepard, 1975;
Parsons, 1994; Petit et al., 2003; Seurinck et al., 2004): reaction
times are longer when the position of a stimulus (the own
current body position in the present case) does notmatch that
of the target stimulus (front-facing body positions in the OBT-
task and back-facing body positions in the Mirror-task). We
also replicated the finding that performance for the OBT-task
was superior to the one for the Mirror-task (faster responding,
Fig. 2 – Mean percent accuracy for OBE participants in the
Mirror-task and OBT-task for back-facing and front-facing
body positions for Repeat Trials (A) and Switch Trials (B).
Vertical bars denote D1SE.
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imagery employing disembodied self-location and perspective
(potentially relating to an extrinsic egocentric coordinate
system) is easier to perform than mental imagery employing
embodied self-location and perspective (potentially relating to
an intrinsic egocentric coordinate system (see e.g., Buxbaum
et al., 2000; Shenton et al., 2004)). These overall findings would
also indicate that behavioural differences are not altered, at
least in the present experimental condition, by whether
participants performed SwT or RepT [see Creem-Regehr et al.
(2007) for a related behavioural finding when using a block-
design or an intermixed-design when assessing two egocen-
tric transformation tasks].
Of crucial importance to the present study is the finding
that OBE-individuals did not differ from nOBE-individuals in
mean RTs but showed inferior performance to nOBE-individ-
uals with respect to their correctness in switching between
the two task instructions, in particular when switching
required to respond to the commonly easier body position of
each task (front-facing body position in the Mirror-task,back-facing body position in the OBT-task). By controlling for
participants’ PerMag scores, we could exclude the possibility
that this group difference was mediated by individuals’ posi-
tive schizotypy (Arzy et al., 2007; McCreery and Claridge, 1995,
1996, 2002; Mohr et al., 2006).
Based on the previous literature on the brain correlates of
switching performance, the present findings would indicate
that fronto-parietal integration might be compromised in
OBE-individuals as compared to nOBE-individuals selected
from the general population. Previous studies not only
reported that effective switching is dependent on the PFC
(Kumada and Humphreys, 2006; Mansouri et al., 2006; Pas-
singham et al., 2000), but also that switching performance
depends on the dynamic interplay between the PFC and the
TPJ and the parietal lobe in general (Chafee and Goldman-
Rakic, 1998; Dove et al., 2000; Ruge et al., 2005). Some authors
suggested that the flow of information is from the frontal to
the parietal lobe with the former relevant to response selec-
tion and the latter in stimulus analysis (Ruge et al., 2005).
Consequently, we here suggest that OBEs do not only relate to
a disintegration of multisensory integration at the TPJ (Blanke
et al., 2004; Blanke et al., 2005) but also that the PFC is likely to
contribute to this impaired self-processing.
Of special interest is the finding that impaired performance
for SwT in OBE-individuals as compared to nOBE-individuals
were restricted to front-facing body positions in the Mirror-
task and back-facing body positions in the OBT-task, i.e., task
conditions commonly facilitated, because they directly match
the own current body position (Overney et al., 2009, this issue).
On the one hand, the observation that impaired switching is
restricted to some but not all body positions seems reassuring:
It would exclude, at least to some extent, the obvious possi-
bility that switching in OBE-individuals might be hampered
for any switching task (e.g., tasks using objects instead of body
stimuli). Only future studies will be able to firmly exclude the
possibility that OBE-individuals also show increased switch
costs for some but not all object orientations. On the other
hand, the present findings are inconsistent with what one
could probably expect: impaired switching should rather be
observed for SwT of the OBT-task than of the Mirror-task, and
potentially also more strongly for the body position
mimickingmost strongly an OBE (front-facing body positions).
Support for this claimwould come fromprevious findings that
OBEs relate to TPJ activation when performing mental own
body imagery in the OBT-task (Blanke et al., 2005). Since a less
dominant TPJ activation was observed for the Mirror-task as
compared to the OBT-task (Arzy et al., 2006), one might
suggest that the Mirror-task as compared to the OBT-task
would be less sensitive to target brain processes related to
OBEs. The present studywould, however, indicate that at least
the sudden confrontation with front-facing figures under the
Mirror-task instruction capture some cognitive processes
related to OBEs. Thus, individuals with prior OBEs appear to
have a general problem when being suddenly instructed to
imagine being in a body position and perspective thatmatches
the actual own body position, but only when just having
performed egocentric perspective taking within a different
coordinate system. Since the Mirror-task is yet little explored
[we are only aware of the study by Arzy et al. (2006)], we
can only conjecture that the present findings might reflect
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OBE-individuals. This impairmentmight be similar to the self-
disturbances reported from patients with passivity symptoms
(Farrer et al., 2004; see also Spence et al., 1997). Farrer et al.
(2004) showed an aberrant activation of the right angular
gyruswhenmaking agency decisions (self, distorted, other) on
hands moving a joystick that were perfectly in concordance
with the patients’ own hand movements. Relating body
stimuli (Peled et al., 2003), movement (Farrer et al., 2004;
Lindner et al., 2005; Spence et al., 1997), and self-face recog-
nition (but see Irani et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2007) fast and effi-
ciently to oneself seems one cardinal impairment when
individuals suffer from pathological forms of self-distortions
such as in schizophrenia, which might help to explain the
current findings. If this explanation holds true, and the TPJ
and its modulation by the PFC would be crucial to OBEs, we
would predict that future studies would observe that the two
brain areas and their connectivity should relate to the
switching impairments described in the present study for
stimuli that are in concordance with the own current body
position.
In conclusion, the present study tested participants’
switching performance between two mental own body
imagery tasks using the same visual stimuli and showed that
switch costs were higher in OBE-individuals as compared to
nOBE-individuals, in particular for the stimuli that matched
the participants’ actual body position (front-facing body
positions in the Mirror-task, back-facing body positions in the
OBT-task). This observation suggests that OBEs might be
mediated by a functional disconnection of information
between the PFC and the TPJ. While previous studies targeting
the cerebral underpinnings of OBEs pointed to the role of the
TPJ (Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke and Mohr, 2005; Brandt et al.,
2005), the present findings extend these observations to the
PFC and their anatomical connections. The understanding of
the cognition and the brain correlates of disturbance in self
representation such as experienced during OBEs and related
experiences is yet in its infancy. Recently, neuropsychological
studies increase in number using empirical paradigms that
are valuable in the understanding of OBEs, whether this refers
to clinical (Blanke et al., 2005) or healthy (Arzy et al., 2007; Arzy
et al., 2006; Blanke et al., 2005; Mohr et al., 2006) populations.
The conjecture we feel safe to formulate is that mental own
body imagery appears increasingly valuable in the investiga-
tion of disturbed self representation (present study; Arzy et al.,
2007; Blanke et al., 2005; Mohr et al., 2006), that OBEs (present
study; Blanke et al., 2005) and schizotypal thought (Arzy et al.,
2007; Mohr et al., 2006) relate to this cognitive ability.
Finally, we would like to note that we are currently unable
to exclude the possibility that othermediating variablesmight
explain the present group difference in SwT. Without being
complete, we here list personality variables, physiological
measures, and cognitive processes that have previously been
related to OBEs: individuals’ somatoform (Murray and Fox,
2005a, 2005b) but not general dissociative (Arzy et al., 2007)
tendencies, body dissatisfaction (Murray and Fox, 2005b),
dissociative alterations in one’s body image during a mirror-
gazing task (Terhune, 2006), arousal (Nelson et al., 2007), the
separation of participants who either experienced their OBEs
in a sleep-related or sleep-unrelated state (Cheyne and Girard,2009, this issue), weak synesthetic experiences (Terhune,
2009, this issue), and cannabis use (Overney et al., 2009,
this issue). Also, if the present findings point to a specific
impairment of OBE-individuals to quickly imagine a perspec-
tive that matches the own actual body position (when
having performed a different perspective taking task before),
TPJ activation might also be engaged during unexpected
confrontations with the own face. Certainly, it remains to be
elucidated why OBE-individuals were not generally impaired
for front-facing body positions in the Mirror-task and back-
facing body positions in the OBT-task as well (RepT) (Overney
et al., 2009, this issue), but only when switching to these trials.
If it is the sudden change to match a body stimulus perfectly
concordantwith the own current body position, then, the here
observed increased switch costs in OBE-individuals may be
reduced in a cued task switching paradigm with increasing
cue–target-intervals (Rogers and Monsell, 1995). This sugges-
tion would be supported by a recent study showing that
disturbed self presentation in schizophrenia might relate to
early processing stages of stimulus characteristics (Posada
et al., 2007). Finally, it remains to be elucidatedwhy the feeling
of self agency is not compromised in OBE but in schizophrenia
(Frith, 2005) as well as in independent delusional misidentifi-
cations (Feinberg and Keenan, 2005). Despite these open
questions, and given the hypothesis-based predictions
generated from previous studies (Blanke and Mohr, 2005;
Mohr and Blanke, 2005), we conjecture that OBEs aremediated
by a disintegration of information from the PFC, and that the
testing of individuals with previous OBEs, albeit not experi-
encing one at the time of testing, might be valuable to gain
insight into brain mechanisms related to intact as well as
dysfunctional processing related to self representation.
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